Abstract. Gentzen's and Prawitz's approach to deductive systems, and Carnap's and Popper's treatment of probability in logic were two fruitful ideas of logic in the mid-twentieth century. By combining these two concepts, the notion of sentence probability, and the deduction relation formalized by means of inference rules, we introduce a system of inference rules based on the traditional proof-theoretic principles enabling to work with each form of probabilized propositional formulae. Namely, for each propositional connective, we define at least one introduction and one elimination rule, over the formulae of the form A [a, b] with the intended meaning that 'the probability c of truthfulness of a sentence A belongs to the interval [a, b] 
Introduction
The need for formal consideration of 'probability of a proposition' is as old as the need for formalism covering the truthfulness of propositions. The interactions between logic and probability theory inspired many fruitful ideas [1, [5] [6] [7] 15, 22, 25] . The recent authors deal usually with Hilbert-style extensions of propositional calculi by probability operators making it possible to manipulate formally with proposition probabilities [12-14, 16, 19, 24, 26] . On the other side, the investigations of probability logic calculi in natural deduction style are very rare [8] , although there are interesting papers treating other kinds of approximate reasoning through the inference rules and deduction relation [10, 11, 21] .
In this paper we present a probability logic based on classical propositional calculus enabling one to work with formulae of the form A [a, b] meaning that 'the probability c of truthfulness of a sentence A belongs to the interval [a, b] '. We present a syntactic system of inference rules which is sound and complete with respect to the Carnap-Popper-type probabilistic semantics [6, 16, 17, 22] . Let us emphasize that, although Poper and Carnap do not belong to the same school of thought, in this field they have absolutely common ideas and equivalent approaches [16] . Our paper is organized as follows. The formalism of a probabilized natural deduction system NKprob is followed by the notions of consistency and NKprobtheory. The system NKprob consists of inference rules covering each propositional connective by at least one introduction rule, and one elimination rule, with the best possible probability bounds. Probabilistic models, inspired with Carnap-Poper's traditional approach, are accompanied by soundness and completeness results, and presented in the concluding part of the paper.
A system of probabilized natural deduction NKprob
In this paragraph we define and introduce the basic syntactic elements of deduction system NKprob. We suppose that the set of propositional formulae is defined inductively over a denumerable set of propositional letters and basic propositional connectives: ¬, ∧, ∨ and →. We also suppose that I is a finite subset of reals [0, 1] containing 0 and 1, closed under addition, meaning that, for instance, a + b denotes the min(1, a + b), and a + b − 1 denotes the max(0, a + b − 1). An example of such a set is I = 0, On the other side, we emphasize that combining probabilistic formulae by means of propositional connectives is not allowed.
Our system is defined over the set of all probabilized formulae. The system NKprob has the following two types of axioms: For each propositional formula A provable in classical logic (i.e. in Gentzen's original NK), the probabilized formula A [1, 1] is an axiom of the system NKprob.
The system NKprob consists of the following inference rules: For each propositional connective we define the corresponding introduction (I-) and elimination (E-)rules, for conjunction:
disjunction:
implication:
additivity rule:
which can be considered an additional case treating (E∧) and (I∨) rules, two monotonicity rules:
and, finally, two rules regarding inconsistency: An alternative way to present the inference rules of NKprob could be in terms of the deduction relation. For example, the rules (I∨), (E∨) and (I∅) would have the following forms: 
NKprob-Theories
In order to obtain a good basis for completeness proof, we define the notion of a consistent theory.
Definition 3.1. By an NKprob-theory (or theory) we mean a set of formulas which are derivable from the set of hypothesis points c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c m of the set I. Let T ′ = n∈ω T n . Then, by induction on n we will prove that T ′ is a maximal consistent extension of T . First, we prove that if T n is consistent, then T n+1 is consistent. The only interesting case is when T n+1 = T n ∪ {A n [c m , c m ]}, which is justified directly by the rule (I∅). In order to prove that T ′ is a maximal consistent extension of T we extend T ′ by the probabilized formula A k [a, b] . In case that this is a proper extension, we already have that the theory
, and, consequently, this extension will be inconsistent.
Semantics, soundness and completeness
In this part we describe models for NKprob. 
ii) if p(A ∧ B) = 0, then p(A ∨ B) = p(A) + p(B); (iii) if A ↔ B in classical logic, then p(A) = p(B).
Let us emphasize that the above conditions roughly correspond to Carnap's and Popper's sentence probability axioms [6, 22] , variations of which were considered by Leblanc and van Fraassen [16] [17] [18] 
(see also [3, 4]).
Justification of additivity and monotonicity rules is given by the following statement:
classical logic, then p(A) p(B).

Proof. (a) From p(A) = p((A ∧ ¬B) ∨ (A ∧ B)) = p(A ∧ ¬B) + p(A ∧ B) and p(A ∨ B) = p((A ∧ ¬B) ∨ B) = p(A ∧ ¬B) + p(B) we infer p(A) + p(B) = p(A ∧ B) + p(A ∨ B).
( I-rules will be justified by the following statement:
The bounds in (a), (b), and (c) are the best possible.
Proof. (a) Immediately, by Lemma 4.1, we have p(
(A). Similarly we obtain p(A ∧ B) p(B). (b) p(A∨B) = p(A)+p(¬A∧B) p(A), and similarly we have p(A∨B) p(B). The upper bound is obtained by p(A ∨ B) = p(A) + p(B) − p(A ∧ B) p(A) + p(B). (c) This inequality follows from p(A → B) = p(¬A ∨ B) and part (b). (d) 1 = p(⊤) = p(A ∨ ¬A) = p(A) + p(¬A).
A general approach to the best possible bounds computation of the probability of a logical function of events, based on linear programming methods, was developed by Hailperin (1965) ; according to him [26] , Fréchet (1935) was first shown that the well known Boole's and Bonferroni's inequalities are the best possible.
E-rules correspond to the following statement:
( Finally, we give a lemma, as formulated in [2] , dealing with the hypothetical syllogism rule. A[a, a], B[b, b] and C [c, c] in NKprob, we can infer (A → B)[a, b] and (B → C)[c, d ] in NKprob we can infer
b) If a p(A) b and c p(A ∨ B) d, then c − b p(B) d. (c) If a p(A) b and c p(A → B) d, then a + c − 1 p(B) d. (d) If a p(¬B) b and c p(A → B) d, then
Lemma 4.4. (a) From
Proof. (a) Let us consider the following Gentzen-type derivation:
where the first step ( * ) has done by the Gentzen's rule for 'introducing the implication in antecedent' (→⊢) having the following general form:
while the step denoted by ( * * ) can be considered a particular case of the cut rule, i.e., modus ponens rule: ⊢ B A, B ⊢ C A ⊢ C This derivation justifies that the hypothetical syllogism rule can be inferred as a logical consequence of the modus ponens rule. Let us us denote the probability of
On the other hand, bearing in mind Hailperin's result [13] related to the probability analogue of modus ponens rule, i.e., its particular case denoted by ( * * ), we have Note that this Lemma generalizes and contains as its particular subcases both results Hailperin's modus ponens probabilized [13] and Wagner's modus tollens probabilized [26] .
As an immediate consequence of the lemmata above, we obtain the soundness:
Theorem 4.1. If an NKprob-theory has a model, then it is consistent.
Proof. By induction on the length of the proof for any formula A[a, b] provable in NKprob we can prove that the system NKprob is sound; this fact follows immediately from our justification of inference rules through Lemmata 4.2 and 4.3. Let us point out that the rule (I∅) is justified simply by the assumption that our model consists of a mapping p : For → I. Consequently, any satisfiable set of formulae {σ 1 , . . . , σ n } is consistent with respect to NKprob.
In order to prove the completeness part, we define the notion of canonical model. Let Cn NKprob(σ 1 , . . . , σ n )) be the set of all NKprob(σ 1 , . . . , σ n )-provable formulae and ConExt(Cn (NKprob(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ))) the class of all its maximal consistent extensions, existing by Lemma 3.1.
Definition 4.3. For any X ∈ ConExt(Cn (NKprob(σ 1 , . . . , σ n ))) we define
Obviously, such a definition provides that the mapping p X , depending on X, has the adequate values.
For short, below we omit X from the denotation for p X . Then, we also have:
Lemma 4.5. The canonical model is a model.
Proof. Let p be any mapping defined as above on an arbitrary maximal consistent set of any NKprob-theory. Then:
(1) We have that p(A) = 1, for each formula A which is classically provable, since A [1, 1] is an axiom. Proof. Bearing in mind that each consistent theory can be extended to a maximal consistent theory, and that such theory is described exactly as the canonical model, it suffices to prove that for each consistent theory there is a world of the canonical model satisfying it.
Concluding remarks
Natural deduction systems introduced by Gentzen [9] and developed by Prawitz [23] were the antipode to the Hilbert style presenting logical systems in the sense that in the later case the axioms have a dominant role, while in the first one the inference rules dominate. Each one of these approaches to logical systems presentation has some advantages. From the proof-theoretical view point, the natural deductions facilitate immediate work with propositions by means of inference rules, and this was the reason that we develop a system making it easy to operate with probabilistic forms. Our approach, potentially applicable in the form of theories with probabilized propositions, has, as its main justification, soundness and completeness results respecting traditional Carnap's [6] and Popper's [22] type probability semantics.
